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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Right to Counsel
In Gerardi v. United States' the defendant pleaded guilty
to a charge of entering a bank with the intent to commit a
felony. 2 In a motion to vacate the sentence, the defendant
alleged inadequacy of counsel. In ruling on this motion the
court prescribed that
[t]he charge of inadequate legal representation can
prevail only if it can be said that what was done or
was not done by the attorney made the proceedings
a farce and a mockery of justice, shocking to the
court's conscience, and the speculation, hope, or fact
that a different or more palatable result might have
been obtained by a different lawyer does not mean
the defendant has not had effective assistance of
counsel.
3
The court reviewed the trial record and determined that the
defendant's motion failed to meet their prescription; it was
therefore denied.
The denial of effective assistance of counsel was again
raised in a habeas corpus proceeding in Cousar -v. State.4 The
contention of the defendant was that the time between ap-
pointment of counsel and entry of the plea was, per se, in-
sufficient for adequate consideration and preparation of the
case.8 Upon an examination of the trial transcript and testi-
mony of the parties involved, the court found that the de-
fendant had effective assistance of counsel and the dismissal
of the writ was affirmed. Factors indicating sufficient time
were: (1) Experienced attorneys carefully interviewed the
defendant over a period of several hours on two different
days; (2) additional investigation other than interviewing
1. 276 F. Supp. 956 (D.S.C. 1967).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1964).
3. 276 F. Supp. at 957.
4. 250 S.C. 47, 156 S.E.2d 331 (1967).
5. Id. at 50, 156 S.E.2d at 331. The record indicated that the defense
attorneys were appointed upon return of the indictment by the grand jury,
entered a plea of not guilty, and the next afternoon changed the plea to
guilty.
1
Fisher: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
1968] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE SURVEYED 547
the client was conducted by counsel; (3) the defendant ad-
mitted his guilt and negotiated a guilty plea; and (4) the
defendant requested that counsel arrange to dispose of the
case on the second day of the term.
In Dixon v. State,6 a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a
similar contention was raised. The defendant asserted that
counsel had been appointed only two days before his trial
for murder, which resulted in a manslaughter conviction. The
court reviewed the record and after taking testimony denied
the writ, holding that the defense counsel had ample time.
The court further concluded that no motion for continuance
had been made because of the attorney's belief that further
delay would not be to the benefit of the accused. The court
stated that "an unnecessary and unexplained delay between
incarceration and the appointment of counsel gives rise to
a prima face case of the denial of the effectiveness of counsel,
and the burden of proving lack of prejudice is shifted to the
state."'7 The court here decided that the state had met its
burden and had shown that there was no prejudice to the
case of the defendant.
In 1956 three defendants pleaded guilty to rape. Two of
the accused were represented by retained counsel and the
third did not object to being included in the representation.
Eight years after his conviction, the third defendant, by a
habeas corpus proceeding, asserted that he had not accepted
the representation of the two attorneys who had represented
his co-defendants.8 The court found the trial transcript bare
of any objection on the part of the defendant with respect
to representation. Testimony by the attorneys for the co-de-
fendants indicated that it was their understanding that they
were representing the defendant in addition to the co-defend-
ants. On these facts the court stated that it would be "trifling
with the court" to allow the defendant to deny the authority
of his attorneys when he remained silent during the original
trial.
B. Arrest and Searck and Seizure
Arrest. In United States v. LawsonP the defendant had
rented a motel room and was seen departing at night with
6. 272 F. Supp. 674 (D.S.C. 1967).
7. Id. at 678.
8. Ross v. State, 158 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1967).
9. 384 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
2
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a television set. He left by the rear of the motel with his
automobile lights out and became involved in a high speed
chase with the police. During the chase the officers were
advised by radio that a television set was missing from the
defendant's motel room. He was apprehended and during the
officer's search for the television set, incriminating matter
was found indicating that the car in which he was riding
was stolen. The defendant was convicted of interstate trans-
portation of a stolen automobile. On appeal, he contended lack
of probable cause on the part of the arresting officer. The
court affirmed the conviction by noting that the information
given the officers during the chase gave probable cause to
arrest.
The defendant in State v. Hamilton1 was arrested without
a warrant and subsequently tried and convicted of murder.
A billfold belonging to the victim was found in the de-
fendant's possession at the time of the arrest and was in-
troduced into evidence at the trial. On appeal, the defendant
sought a reversal on the grounds that the arrest was without
probable cause and the evidence, therefore, should have been
excluded as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Since the record
of the trial was void of testimony as to the validity of the
arrest, the court remanded to determine whether the arresting
officers had probable cause. The court established this stand-
ard for the lower court to use in its determination: whether
at the moment of arrest, the facts within the arresting of-
ficers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trust-
worthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the defendant had committed an offense.
In State v. Poinsettn the defendant had interfered with
police officers while they were attempting to make an arrest
of a third party. Subsequent to this interference, an arrest
warrant was issued for the defendant. The authorities at-
tempted to serve the warrant at the defendant's residence.
He resisted the arrest by firing a pistol at the authorities.
The defendant was subsequently arrested, tried, and con-
victed of pointing and discharging a firearm. On appeal, he
contended that the arrest warrant was ineffective since served
on Sunday in violation of Section 17-259 of the South Carolina
10. 159 S.E.2d 607 (S.C. 1968).
11. 250 S.C. 293, 157 S.E.2d 570 (1967).
548 [Vol. 20
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Code.' 2 The court affirmed the conviction by construing the
statutory phase "breach of the peace" as including any crime
which violates the public peace, and stated:
In general terms a breach of the peace is a violation
of public order, a disturbance of the public tran-
quility, by any act or conduct inciting to violence,
which included any violation of any law enacted to
preserve peace and good order.'5
The court then included the offense of pointing and discharg-
ing a firearm at a person as a breach of the peace, thus
permitting the Sunday service of the arrest warrant.
Search and Seizure. In United States v. Campbe l14 agents
of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of The Internal Rev-
enue Service had received reliable information of an impend-
ing purchase of illegal liquor. Although lacking a warrant
for search or arrest, the agents staked out the home of the
defendant by hiding in his cornfield. When the agents saw
what appeared to be an illegal purchase, they arrested the
defendant and seized a jug of liquor. In denying defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence as illegally obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure, the court stated that the
protections of the fourth amendment are not so broad as to
extend to open fields.
In State v. Richburg.5 the defendant was arrested and tried
for murder. At the trial a pistol found in the defendant's
house was introduced into evidence, although no warrant had
been issued for a search of the house. The record was bare
as to the legality of the search and seizure. The court recog-
nized the current habeas corpus standard requiring specific
findings of fact when the legality of a search and seizure
is in question and applied this standard to the trial itself.
The court remanded, stating that in order to make a proper
determination of the legality of the search and seizure, the
specific findings of fact should be made within the trial
itself so that the findings may be subject to appeal and
review in the conventional fashion.
12. The statute reads in part, "[n]o criminal process shall be served on
Sunday, except for treason, felony, violation of the laws relating to intox-
icating liquors or breach of the peace." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-259 (1962).
13. 250 S.C. at 297, 157 S.E.2d at 571; see State v. Edwards, 239 S.C.
839, 123 S.E.2d 247 (1961).
14. 275 F. Supp. 7 (D.S.C. 1967).
15. 158 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 1968).
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss4/3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A search warrant served forty-two days after issuance
was found to exceed a reasonable time for execution in State
v. Baker.' The defendant had been arrested and tried for
possessing and keeping alcoholic liquor in a place of business.1 7
After conviction, an appeal was taken on the ground that
the warrant was stale. The court reversed, finding that the
warrant had been served more than a reasonable time after
its issuance and holding that evidence obtained thereunder
was inadmissible. The court said that when testing a war-
rant for staleness, a reasonable time can be determined only
by considering the special facts of each case.""
In State v. York 9 a search warrant was issued on the basis
of an affidavit which stated only that the affiant had good
reason to believe that the defendant had contraband concealed
on her premises. The affidavit, however, failed to provide
any facts upon which the affiant's belief was based. The
subsequent search produced evidence which led to the trial
and conviction of the defendant for unlawful possession of
drugs. 20 On appeal, the court reversed, indicating that the
affidavit lacked sufficient facts to form the basis of a judg-
ment by the issuing magistrate as to the existence of prob-
able cause. Because the affidavit was deficient, the sub-
sequent search warrant was nullified and the evidence thus
obtained was excluded.
In Squires v. SLED2' an action for claim and delivery was
brought by the owner of certain machine parts, subassemblies,
dyes and molds used for slot machines. The parts had been
seized by the state authorities pursuant to Section 5-622 of
the South Carolina Code. 22 The owner contended that the
statute permitting the seizure and destruction of slot ma-
chines did not extend to the parts or components. The court
affirmed the seizure, holding that although the statute did
not explicitly extend to parts, it would be inconsistent for
16. 160 S.E.2d 556 (S.C. 1968).
17. The alcoholic liquor was found in a filling station, thus violating
S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-95 (1962).
18. See, e.g., Farmer v. Sellers, 89 S.C. 492, 72 S.E. 224 (1911), in which
the jury found forty-eight days between issuance and service of a warrant
to be within a reasonable time.
19. 250 S.C. 30, 156 S.E.2d 326 (1967).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1313 (1962).
21. 249 S.C. 609, 155 S.E.2d 859 (1967).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-622 (1962) provides: "[Any vending or slot
machine, punch board, pull board or other device pertaining to games of
chance prohibited by § 5-621 shall be seized .... 
(Vol. 20
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the legislature to authorize the seizure of slot machines but
not their component parts.
Miscellaneous. In State v. Nelson 23 and State v. Ladd24 the
court faced the issue of whether a lineup confrontation
violated the current constitutional standards. It is to be
noted that the United States Supreme Court in Stovall v.
Denno25 stated that a denial of due process of law occurs
when the confrontation is unnecessarily suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable mistaken identification. Stovall con-
tinued by stating that the rules in United States v. Wade26
and Gilbert v. California,27 requiring exclusion of identifi-
cation evidence, which had been tainted by exhibiting the
accused to identifying witnesses before trial in absence of his
counsel, were not to be applied retroactively. Since the area
is now governed by the Supreme Court decision, the outcome
of the state cases is not commented on here.
C. Solicitor and Judge
In State v. Hamilton28 the defendant was tried for murder.
In the voir dire questioning, the trial judge asked jurors
whether they were opposed to capital punishment. The judge,
however, refused the defense counsel's request that the jurors
be asked whether they would be disposed to grant mercy in
a case on a given set of facts and circumstances. The trial
judge's refusal was affirmed on appeal as being within his
discretion and not subject to review in the absence of clear
abuse.
In 1962, Hopson Wilson entered a written plea of guilty to
assault and battery and an oral plea of guilty to burglary.
He was subsequently found guilty on both counts and sen-
tenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of ten and twenty-
five years respectively. Approximately three years later, in
Wilson v. State29 habeas corpus proceedings were commenced
challenging his conviction of burglary pursuant to the oral
guilty plea. His position was that since the assault and bat-
tery plea was in writing and the burglary plea oral, the oral
23. 250 S.C. 6, 156 S.E.2d 841 (1967).
24. 161 S.E.2d 230 (S.C. 1968).
25. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
26. 888 U.S. 218. (1967).
27. 888 U.S. 263 (1967).
28. 159 S.E.2d 607 (S.C. 1968).
29. 159 S.E.2d 282 (S.C. 1968).
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plea was improperly entered and thus the burglary sentence
was illegal. The lower court refused to set aside the sentence.
On appeal the supreme court stated that "[w]hile it is the
better, and suggested, practice in such cases to have the
accused sign a plea of guilty when such is entered, there is
no stautory requirement in this State that such plea be in
writing or in any particular form. °30 In the present case, the
court affirmed the denial of the writ because the record
indicated that the accused was represented by counsel, in-
formed of the nature of the accusation to which he was to
plead, and advised of the possible results to him under a
trial and a plea. The court concluded by stating that the
mere absence of his signature does not vitiate the otherwise
valid plea.
The question of voluntariness of a guilty plea arose in
Thompson v. MacDougall.31 The defendant had been indicted
for murder and had pleaded guilty. He asked for mercy and
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Later, a writ of habeas
corpus was filed in the state court on the question of volun-
tariness of the guilty plea. The lower court found the plea to
be voluntary, and on appeal the state supreme court af-
firmed. 32 The defendant, having exhausted all state remedies,
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the same grounds in the
federal district court. At the hearing, the defendant's trial
counsel changed his testimony. He had testified in the state
proceedings that he knew of no reason why the plea was not
voluntary. In the federal proceedings, however, counsel ac-
knowledged that the guilty plea was voluntary only to the
extent that the defendant "did what his attorneys told him to
do." This divergence was crucial to the guilty plea in view
of the requirement that a guilty plea be the "reasoned choice"
of the defendant himself.33 The federal court retained juris-
diction for a reasonable time in order that the state court
might be allowed to pass on the effect of the new evidence
and to modify its prior decision if it so chose.
In 1965, Huel Bailey pleaded guilty to murder and was
sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. In Bailey
v. MacDougall,34 a state habeas corpus proceeding, the de-
30. Id. at 285.
31. 272 F. Supp. 313 (D.S.C. 1967).
32. Thompson v. State 248 S.C. 475, 151 S.E.2d 221 (1966).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Gilligan, 363 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. 162 S.E.2d 177 (S.C. 1968).
[Vol. 20
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fendant alleged that amnesia had affected the voluntariness
of his guilty plea. The defendant contended that he was not
in control of his mental faculties at the time the guilty plea
was entered. The lower court denied relief and on appeal the
decision was affirmed. In reaching its decision, the court
relied upon testimony of lay observers who were present at
the trial. They testified that when the defendant was ques-
tioned as to the voluntariness of his plea, he appeared fully
in control of his faculties. The court indicated further that
if medical testimony as to amnesia had been presented, this
testimony would have affected the weight but not the com-
petence or admissibility of lay testimony.
In State v. Cantrel35 the defendant entered a plea of guilty
to housebreaking and petty larceny. After receiving the plea
and with a view to fixing the sentence, the trial judge began
reading a statement concerning the past conduct of the de-
fendant. When it became apparent that the defendant was
not going to be given a probationary sentence, counsel for
the defendant moved to withdraw the guilty plea. The trial
court refused the motion and sentenced the defendant to two
years in prison. On appeal, the court stated that the motion
to withdraw the guilty plea was addressed to the discretion
of the trial judge and his action would not be altered absent
clear abuse of that discretion.3 6 The court in reviewing the
record found no clear abuse and thus affirmed the con-
viction.
Pre-sentence reports came under review in Baker v. United
States37 when the defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery.
The trial court, on reviewing the pre-sentence report, com-
mented that the seriousness of the defendant's previous record
could not be overlooked. The defendant did not see the report
and on appeal contended that the report was not accurate,
and as a result of the deviation, the sentencing judge had
been given a distorted picture of the defendant's past conduct.
The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for
further consideration. In the opinion, the court set forth
35. 250 S.C. 376, 158 S.E.2d 189 (1967).
36. A motion for new trial must be made, absent newly discovered evi-
dence, before adjournment of the term at which trial was had, or before
sentence or judgment, or upon a case made up and settled by the judge
who tried the case. State v. David, 14 S.C. 428 (1880). See also Catoe v.
State, 241 S.C. 351, 128 S.E.2d 417 (1962).
37. 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968).
553
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minimum requirements with respect to pre-sentence reports :8
(1) The sentencing judge should apprise the defendant of
important matters of public record as conviction and charges
of crime attributed to the defendant in the pre-sentence re-
port; (2) the defendant should then have an opportunity to
comment; and (3) no conviction or criminal charge should
be included in the report unless referrable to an official
record.P0 The court, however, is not obligated to divulge the
entire report at any time.
In State v. Cannon40 the defendant in a previous trial
had been convicted of rape. At the original trial a con-
fession by the defendant was introduced into evidence. On
appeal the court remanded for a determination by the trial
court of the voluntariness of the confession. 41 Upon re-
mand, the trial court found that the defendant's confes-
sion was voluntary. The defendant appealed this decision
and the supreme court remanded again, in this instance find-
ing the brief, general trial court statement to be insufficient
with respect to both the determination of admissibility of the
confession and the collateral issue of the search and seizure.
The search and seizure reference concerned certain articles
taken from the defendant's home which appear to have been
in the interrogation room at the time of the confession. There
was a serious question as to the legality of the search and
seizure of the items, and the court remanded the case for a
more specific finding of: (1) the admissibility and volun-
tariness of the confession, (2) the legality of the search and
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c) (2) was amended February 28, 1966, effective
July 1, 1966, to read:
The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any
prior criminal record of the defendant and such information
about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circum-
stances of his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence
or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the
defendant, and such other information as may be required by the
court. The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the
defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained
in the report of the presentence investigation and afford an op-
portunity to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon.
Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also
be disclosed to the attorney for the government.
39. Judge Winter advocated the policy of complete disclosure except for
the confidential recommendation of the probation officer to the sentencing
judge and except where there is tangible good cause to withhold exhibition
of a portion of the report. 388 F.2d at 934 (concurring opinion).
40. 158 S.E.2d 357 (S.C. 1967).
41. State v. Cannon, 248 S.C. 506, 151 S.E.2d 752 (1966).
[Vol. 20554
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seizure, and (3) the possibility of an induced confession by
use of articles illegally seized.
The defendant in State v. Goodwin42 was convicted of in-
voluntary manslaughter and based his appeal upon the intro-
duction of an oral confession. The court found the confession
admissible because it was introduced by testimony elicited
by the defendant's counsel on cross-examination of a patrol-
man to whom the defendant had made the admission.
In State v. Marshal43 the defendant was charged with "driv-
ing while under the influence." During the trial, testimony
was offered by the defendant that he had ran off the road
and while waiting for assistance had a drink of bourbon
whiskey. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
denied, and the jury brought in a guilty verdict. An appeal
was taken on the judge's refusal to grant the defendant a
directed verdict. The court affirmed the conviction stating
that
on a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty, the
testimony must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the State. The ease must be submitted to the jury
if there is substantial evidence reasonably tending to
prove the defendant's guilt, or from which his guilt
may be fairly and logically deduced. 4
D. Indictments
In State v. Richburg45 the defendant was convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to death. An appeal was taken upon the
contention that the systematic exclusion of women and Ne-
groes from the grand and petit jury was sufficient grounds
to quash the indictment. Noting that since the trial the state
constitution had been amended to permit women to serve on
juries, 46 the court nonetheless found no Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation under the old state constitutional prohibition.
The court reviewed the record and found no systematic ex-
clusion of Negro jurors. The state in this case had excused
five Negroes by the use of the peremptory challenges. The
court held that these challenges may be used for any cause
42. 250 S.C. 403, 158 S.E.2d 195 (1967).
43. 158 S.E.2d 650 (S.C. 1968).
44. Id. at 651; see State v. Rayfield, 232 S.C. 230, 101 S.E.2d 505 (1958).
45. 158 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 1968).
46. S.C. COzNST. art. 5, § 22.
10
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satisfactory to counsel or for no cause, and it is not the
province of the trial judge or appellate court to interfere.
In Gerardi v. United States17 a motion to vacate sentence
by attacking the indictment as insufficient was denied when
it was shown, in a review of the trial record, that the de-
fendant had not objected to or challenged the sufficiency of
the indictment on arraignment or on the plea of guilty. The
court stated it would grant relief only on a showing that the
indictment was so obviously defective that by no reasonable
construction could it be said to charge the offense for which
the conviction was had. The court found the indictment to
be within the acceptable limits.
E. Habeas Corpus
Joseph Earl Sullivan was tried and convicted of safe-crack-
ing but no appeal was taken. Later, in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding,4 8 the defendant attempted to show that the compart-
ment was not a safO because it was not used for storing
money or other valuables. The lower court denied the writ,
and it was affirmed on the grounds that the defendant could
not challenge by a habeas corpus proceeding the sufficiency
of the evidence used to sustain the conviction.50
In Posey v. State5' the defendant sought, by both habeas
corpus proceedings and appeal to avoid the sentence. The
proceedings were focused on the lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court. The claim was based on the defendant's allega-
tion that the rape occured in a different county than the
trial. The record of the trial indicated that there was conflict
with respect to this point and that the trial judge had sub-
mitted the issue to the jury, who resolved it in favor of the
state. The court approved of the trial judge's submission
of the issue of jurisdiction to the jury, finding that in the
presence of conflicting testimony the jury's verdict is con-
clusive of the question of jurisdiction.
In Young v. State12 the defendant sought an unconditional
release using the habeas corpus proceeding. He claimed that
a perjured statement was presented as evidence to the grand
47. 276 F. Supp. 956 (D.S.C. 1967).
48. Sullivan v. State, 159 S.E.2d 918 (S.C. 1968).
49. Id. at 918. The defendant contended that the top compartment of a
metal filing cabinet was the item in question and not a safe.
50. Accord, Medlock v. Spearman, 185 S.C. 296, 194 S.E. 21 (1937).
51. 250 S.C. 55, 156 S.E.2d 340 (1967).
52. 158 S.E.2d 764 (S.C. 1968).
556 [Vol. 20
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jury that indicted him for murder. The murder charge was
later dropped and a gulity plea to manslaughter entered. In
the petition for habeas corpus, the defendant asked for ab-
solute and unconditional release. The court denied this by
reference to Grant v. MacDougall.5  Grant held that when
a guilty plea has been set aside, the petitioner is at most
entitled to a new trial and not to an absolute release. The
court stated in the instant case that even if the indictment
were void, it would not entitle the defendant to an absolute
release.
In March, 1947, Oscar Schneider was arrested and charged
with arson. The court sustained his attorney's motion for a
mental examination and the defendant was sent to the State
Hospital. The examination revealed mental illness, and the
court ordered the defendant confined for the duration of his
sickness. Some years later in Schneider v. State,5 4 the de-
fendant instituted habeas corpus proceedings. The writs were
denied in the lower court, and on appeal the defendant in-
troduced a new argument, that he was not represented by a
guardian ad litem during the commitment proceedings. The
court, sympathetic toward appellant's particular situation,
took the case regarding it as a belated appeal from the origi-
nal disposition of the case instead of a habeas corpus appeal.
The court, however, dismissed the appeal on the merits by
distinguishing the instant case, as criminal commitment, from
the defendant's precedent, resting on civil commitment.55
F. Motion for Change of Venue and Continuance
In State v. Bell 66 the defendant was indicted for murder.
The state's psychiatrist spent several hundred hours exam-
ining the defendant whereas the psychiatrist for the defense
was able to see the defendant on only two occasions before
the trial. The defense counsel made a motion for a contin-
uance on the ground that the defense psychiatrist needed
further time for examination. The trial court denied this
motion and after defendant's conviction, an appeal was taken.
On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial
holding that
53. 244 S.C. 387, 137 S.E.2d 270 (1964).
54. 250 S.C. 298, 157 S.E.2d 593 (1967) (per curiam).
55. Accord, Wines v. State, 249 S.C. 191, 153 S.E.2d 392 (1967).
56. 250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967).
12
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[t]he trial judge erred in putting the defendant to
his trial without, at least, affording an opportunity
for a meaningful examination and evaluation of his
mental condition by an admittedly qualified psychia-
trist whose assistance had been enlisted by [defense]
counsel and who stood ready to perform this pro-
fessional service.
57
G. Disqualification of Jurors
In State v. Goodwin58 the defendant was tried and con-
victed of manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant contended
that a conversation which took place during a recess in the
trial between a state witness and a juror was sufficient error
to grant a new trial. The record, however, indicated that the
subject of the conversation was unrelated to the trial. The
court stated that a mere discussion of a matter between a
prosecution witness and a juror, not related to the trial,
was insufficient grounds to grant a new trial, for it pro-
duced no prejudice to the defendant's position.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CRImINAL LAW
A. Conspiracy
In United States v. Leavel 5" a conviction for conspiracy
to violate the National Firearms Act60 was upheld on the
evidence that appellant had sold all the parts necessary to
assemble completely sixteen fifty-calibre machine guns. The
court found that the evidence showed that the defendant
agreed to sell and did sell the machine guns. Evidence further
indicated that the defendant sold the parts to the co-con-
spirators who then assembled and sold the assembled weapons
to undercover agents.
B. Rape
In State v. Gamble6' the defendant was tried and convicted
of rape, and was sentenced to death.62 On appeal, the con-
stitutionality of the death sentence was challenged as consti-
tuting cruel and unusual punishment. The court confirmed
57. Id. at 43, 156 S.E.2d at 316.
58. 250 S.C. 403, 158 S.E.2d 195 (1967).
59. 386 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
60. INT. REY. CODE of 1954, § 5801-62.
61. 249 S.C. 605, 155 S.E.2d 916 (1967).
62. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-72 (1962).
(Vol. 20
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the constitutionality of the death sentence and held that the
death penalty for rape is not cruel and unusual punishment.
C. Assault and Battery
In State v. DeBerry63 the defendant's automobile was
stopped after a seven mile chase at speeds up to one hundred
miles per hour. A scuffle occured between the arresting
officer and the defendant during which the defendant seized
the patrolman's pistol and pointed it at him. The defendant
was later arrested, tried, and convicted of assault and battery
of a high and aggravated nature. An appeal was taken on
the grounds that the state failed to show an assault coupled
with an unlawful act of violent injury under aggravated cir-
cumstances.0 4 The court affirmed the conviction by stating:
Serious bodily harm to the prosecuting witness is
not necessary to establish an assault and battery of
a high and aggravated nature. Should a stranger on
the street embrace a young lady, or a large man im-
properly fondle a child, the assault and battery would
be aggravated though no actual bodily harm was
done. In like fashion, resistance to lawful arrest by
constituted authority accompanied by an unlawful
act against the person of a police officer becomes an
assault and battery and may be of an aggravated na-
ture though the officer suffers no actual bodily
harm.6 5
The defendant further objected to the judge's refusal to
charge the jury for simple assault and battery in addition
to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.
The court affirmed the trial judge's refusal by stating that
the evidence showed either assault and battery of a high
and aggravated nature, or nothing.
D. Forgery
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed the "broad rule" with respect to forgery in the
63. 250 S.C. 314, 157 S.E.2d 637 (1967).
64. Examples of aggravated circumstances include, but are not limited
to: the use of a deadly weapon, the infliction of serious bodily injury, the
intent to commit a felony, the great disparity between the ages and physical
conditions of the parties, a difference in the sexes, indecent liberties or
familiarities with a female, the infliction of shame and disgrace, and re-
sistance of lawful authority. State v. Jones, 133 S.C. 167, 181, 130 S.E.
747, 751 (1925).
65. 250 S.C. at 319-20, 157 S.E.2d at 640.
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case of United States v. Metcalf.6 In that case, the defendant
had opened an account in a fictitious name, drawn a check
in that name and represented himself to the payee as the
fictitious person. The defendant was later convicted of inter-
state transportation of forged securities. 67 On appeal the
defendant contended that under the "narrow rule" the forged
instrument must purport to be the act of another; that is, he
could not forge the name of a fictitious person. The court
rejected this view as being opposed to the current Fourth
Circuit standard68 and then stated that the "broad rule" pre-
vailed. The rule is this:
[O]ne who signs a check or other paper with a fic-
titious name that he represents to be his own is
guilty of forgery if he acts with fraudulent intent,
and if the paper has sufficient appearance of validity
upon its face to enable it to be used to the prejudice
of another. Under the 'narrow rule' it must appear
that the false signature is the act of someone other
than the person actually making it.60
E. Theft
In United States v. Fields70 the defendant rented an auto-
mobile from a commercial rental agency in New York for
one day. Two months later the vehicle was found in South
Carolina. The defendant was arrested and tried for inter-
state transportation of a stolen vehicle. The court was con-
vinced that at the time the automobile was rented or shortly
thereafter, the defendant decided to convert the car to his
own use. It found the defendant guilty by stating that the
Dyer Act 7 encompassed rental automobiles and covered situa-
tions in which the intent to steal is present at the time of
rental and also when the intent arises at some later time.
In State v. Raines72 the defendant was convicted of grand
larceny and appealed on the ground of insufficiency of evi-
dence. The court affirmed the conviction. Upon review of
the record it found that the defendant and a co-worker had
66. 388 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1968).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1964).
68. Cunningham v. United States, 272 F.2d 791, 794 (4th Cir. 1959).
69. 388 F.2d at 442.
70. 271 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1967).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
72. 158 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. 1968).
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gone to the victim's house to pick up a rug. At the defendant's
request, the victim left the house to deliver a message to
defendant's co-worker, leaving the defendant alone in the
victim's house. Shortly after their departure, the victim
noted that a valuable ring was missing and it was subse-
quently found in the truck that the defendant was using. The
court found these facts sufficient to submit the case to the.
jury and did not disturb the jury's finding of guilt.
ADAM FISHER, JR.
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